Elusive Victory
In the first post-9/11 battlefield, the challenges remain complex—and deadly
Frustration. In essence, it comes down to convincing the Afghan people that their government can protect and provide for them. "It's not that the people despise the government," Said Jawad, Afghan ambassador to the United States, tells U.S. News. "But they are frustrated by the fact that the government can't deliver." They still widely back the international troop presence, according to polls showing 80 percent support. But while Afghans are optimistic about their future, they are not quite as optimistic as before: Some 44 percent say their country is headed in the right direction, versus 64 percent in 2004. And while they say life is better today, it is not, they add, as good as it should be after six years of international attention. Half say they are more prosperous than they were under the Taliban; one quarter say they are less so.
Such economic factors are key, particularly when it comes to the Afghan security forces. In the training classes for new police recruits in Kandahar, there is frequent talk of salaries, with the topic woven into the day's lecture on "how to be a good person." On the blackboard at the front of the room are some figures. The first is 3,575. "This is my salary," says the instructor, pointing to the number of Afghanis, the country's currency, that he earns each month-about $72. He gestures toward another figure, 5,000, or about $100. "This is my house payment." Another police instructor notes, "We have children, we take out loans—and we will take from the people that money, like thieves." But he drives home the impact of such graft. "If we take from the people," he says, "our country will never change." And so, he says, the police "sell their belts, their uniforms." In the previous months, others left to harvest opium poppies and never returned.
Then there are those in the employ of warlords. Clancy discovered a number of them when his first class of recruits showed up for training last year. "They were half militia," he says—working for the governor and one of the major drug lords down south. Of the 327 men who came for training, many had visible needle marks and "glassed-over" eyes, signs of drug use. "So we asked them, 'What are you doing here?' And they said, 'Because the governor told me to be here.'" The trainers kept roughly 175 for the first class and ran them through a boot camp so tough that "a couple of the guys hid in the latrine," says Clancy, afraid, he adds, that their drill sergeant "was going to kill them."
But the sway of local warlords, some of whom are now government officials, remains strong. And charges of corruption abound. It has long been rumored that President Karzai's brother, the head of the provincial council in Kandahar, is involved in the drug trade. It is a charge that senior U.S. military officials say they have yet to see any solid evidence to support. "I think if President Karzai had it, he'd find it an intolerable situation," said a senior U.S. military official. Ambassador Jawad says that he has urged Karzai "to make this rumor into a case—or definitely say it's not true." Part of this, he adds, involves "helping to trace" large transfers of funds from Kabul to Dubai. An Afghan Ministry of Interior spokesman says there is no doubt that some high-level officials are involved in the drug trade and that the government is investigating.
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